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State v. Dist. Ct. (Romano), 97 P.3d 594 (Nev. 2004)1
CRIMINAL LAW – MANDAMUS – PROHIBITION
Summary
Real party in interest Robert Romano is charged in an indictment with four counts of
sexual assault of a minor under fourteen years of age and ten counts of lewdness with a child
under fourteen years of age. Romano and his girlfriend are the natural parents of the child
victim, born May 5, 1997.
In November 2002, the child allegedly told her mother that Romano had engaged in
inappropriate activities with her. The mother contacted Nevada Child Protective Services and, at
that agency’s request, took the child to Sunrise Hospital for evaluation. A pediatric emergency
physician at Sunrise testified before the grand jury that the findings of the child’s examination
were normal, meaning that there were no signs of trauma, but that this did not necessarily
preclude the possibility of sexual assault.
On December 19, 2002, the five-year-old child testified before the grand jury that she
knew people were not supposed to touch certain areas of her body. She testified that she had
touched Romano’s penis with her hands. She also demonstrated how she touched him. The
child further testified that Romano had touched her butt with his hands and mouth while they
were both naked and that he told her not to tell anyone. The child’s mother was not present in
the courtroom when the child testified.
Romano did not testify before the grand jury. Instead, he requested that the prosecutor
tell the grand jury that the mother had fabricated these charges and used the child either for
financial gain or to get revenge on Romano.
On January 10, 2003, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Romano with sexual
assault and lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. Subsequently, Romano moved for
an independent psychological examination of the victim, alleging that there was no corroborating
evidence other than the victim’s testimony and that a reasonable basis existed for believing the
victim’s mental or emotional state may have affected her veracity. The district court granted
Romano’s motion. Thereafter, the State petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of
prohibition or, alternatively, for a writ of mandamus.
Issue and Disposition
Issue
Is a petition for writ relief seeking either to prevent the district court from enforcing its
order or compelling it to vacate its order proper in the instant case?
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Disposition
Yes. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in
ordering the child witness to submit to an independent psychological examination by the
defendant’s experts. Accordingly, it granted the State’s petition for a writ of prohibition to
prevent the district court from ordering the child victim to submit to a psychological
examination.
Commentary
State of the Law before State v. Dist. Ct. (Romano)
In Washington v. State,2 the Nevada Supreme Court stated that trial courts have
discretionary authority to order the psychological examination of a sexual assault victim.
However, the court failed to discuss its reasoning for granting trial courts such discretionary
authority. Nor did its decisions subsequent to Washington clarify its reasoning.3
Effect of State v. Dist. Ct. (Romano) on Current Law
The Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that a trial court has the discretion to
order alleged victims to submit to psychological examination under certain narrow
circumstances. The court took this opportunity to clarify its reasoning for granting trial courts
such discretionary authority.
The court noted that although a fixed rule or a rule giving trial courts unbridled discretion
may subject a victim to unnecessary harassment and embarrassment, a defendant has the right to
preserve his constitutional right to a fair trial by countering the State’s proffered evidence. In
Koerschner v. State,4 the court reconciled prior Nevada case law concerning a trial court’s
discretionary power to order the psychological examination of a sexual assault victim. It
concluded that the overriding judicial question is whether a compelling need exists for the trial
court to order a psychological examination.5 In determining whether a compelling need exists,
Koerschner requires a trial court to consider three factors, not necessarily to be given equal
weight: (1) whether the State calls or benefits from a psychological expert, (2) whether little or
no corroboration of the offense exists beyond the victim’s testimony, and (3) “whether there is a
reasonable basis for believing that the victim’s mental or emotional state may have affected his
or her veracity.”6
The court concluded, however, that the Koerschner test does not always adequately
balance the needs of the victim and the defendant. It therefore modified its decision in
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Koerschner, holding that a defendant is entitled to a psychological examination of an alleged
sexual assault victim only where: (1) the State notices the defendant that it intends to examine
the victim by its own expert and (2) the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a compelling
need for a psychological examination. In determining whether a compelling need exists, the trial
court must consider: (1) whether little or no corroboration of the offense exists beyond the
victim’s testimony, and (2) whether there is a reasonable basis “for believing that the victim’s
mental or emotional state may have affected his or her veracity.”7 Moreover, in the exercise of
discretion, the trial courts must set forth a particularized factual finding that there is reason to
believe that a psychological examination is warranted.
The court further held that a victim is not required to submit to a psychological
examination. Where the victim refuses to submit to an examination, however, the State may not
introduce expert evidence, either in a report or testimony that addresses or assesses the victim’s
character.8 “An expert who has personally examined a victim is in a better position to render an
opinion than is an expert who has not done so.”9 Therefore, when the victim refuses to submit to
a psychological examination by a defendant’s expert, both the State and the defendant would be
restricted to the use of generalized testimony submitted by non-examining experts.10
Given its recognition of the validity of Washington and its line of authority and applying
Koerschner, as modified, to the instant case, the court concluded that the district court manifestly
abused its discretion when it ordered the psychological examination of the child victim. Because
the State has not conducted a psychological examination of the child victim and does not intend
to call an examining expert at trial, Romano may not request an independent psychological
examination of the victim.
Summary of the Law in Other Jurisdictions
While the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision is consistent with holdings in several other
jurisdictions,11 California, through the legislative enactment of California Penal Code § 1112,
has taken the position that a trial court may not order victims to submit to psychological
examinations. Section 1112 superseded the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ballard v.
Superior Court of San Diego County,12 which empowered the trial courts with discretionary
authority to order a sexual assault victim to submit to psychological examination. The Ballard
court had articulated antiquated beliefs that women falsely accuse men of sex crimes “as a result
of a mental condition that transforms into fantasy a wishful biological urge,” from aggressive
tendencies directed to the accused or from “a childish desire for notoriety.”13 In overruling
Ballard, in 1986, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that “previous expectational
disparities, which singled out the credibility of rape complainants as suspect, have no place in a
modern system of jurisprudence.”14
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Conclusion
A trial court has the discretion to order alleged sexual assault victims to submit to
psychological examination where: (1) the State notices the defendant that it intends to examine
the victim by its own expert and (2) the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a compelling
need for a psychological examination. In determining whether a compelling need exists, the trial
court must consider: (1) whether little or no corroboration of the offense exists beyond the
victim’s testimony, and (2) whether there is a reasonable basis for believing that the victim’s
mental or emotional state may have affected his or her veracity.
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